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JORISDICTION AND
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS IN LOWER COURT
A. JURISDICTION
This appeal was originally made pursuant to §78-2-2(3)(i),
U.C.A.f 1953f to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah and that
court transferred it to this court pursuant to §78-2-2(4)f U.C.A.,
1953.
B.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS IN LOWER COURT

The case was tried to a jury and at the conclusion of
plaintiff's evidence the Court directed a verdict in favor of the
defendant on the grounds that plaintiff had failed to establish a
prima facie case of liability against defendant

STATEMENT OF ISSDES & RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The determinative issue presented to this court is the
sufficiency of plaintiff's evidence in the lower court
establishing defendant's liability to the plaintiff.

Plaintiff

seeks reversal of the directed verdict in favor of the defendant
and an order granting plaintiff a new trial.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS - STATUTES & ETC,
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes,
ordinances, rules, and regulations, the interpretation of which
is determinative of the issues in this case.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE

This is an action for personal injuries and property damage
arising out of the collapse of the roof of a building owned by
defendant on plaintiff and plaintiff's vehicle.
B.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiff and his wife, on the 25th day of January, 1984,
were in the process of moving from their apartment and to do sof
some cartons were required to pack some of their personal
property.

Plaintiff looked in the yellow pages of the telephone

book where he found the name of a company owned and operated by
Doug Campbell, who sold such cartons.

Plaintiff called Mr.

Campbell and made an appointment to meet him at his Third South &
Rio Grande Street office.

When plaintiff arrived he was advised

by Mr. Campbell that the type of cartons that plaintiff was
seeking were located in a nearby warehouse and Mr. Campbell
instructed the plaintiff to get in plaintiff's own car and follow
Mr. Campbell in his car to the warehouse, and plaintiff did so.
Upon arriving at the warehouse Mr. Campbell drove his car under
the roof of a building into a parking stall, which to plaintiff
had the appearance of a large carport (see plaintiff's Exhibit 1,
Bldg If [said building being rectangular in shape, approximately
180 ft by 50 ft, running North and South and being open on the
East and West sides and being closed on the North and South ends].
See also plaintiff's Exhibit 8).
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Plaintiff, as previously

instructed by Mr. Campbell, continued to follow Mr. Campbell under
the roof of said building, plaintiff driving his car into the
parking stall next to that stall in which Mr. Campbell parked his
car, which was just South and to the right of Mr. Campbell's car.
As plaintiff pulled his car under the West eave of the roof of
said building, the roof collapsed on plaintiff's car while
plaintiff was still in it, totalling his car and injuring
plaintiff.

Other vehicles previously parked under the the roof of

said building at the time it collapsed on plaintiff and his
vehicle included a motorhome, boat, semi-trailer, and another auto
in addition to that of Mr. Campbell.
Mr. Campbell was a tenant of defendant, who owned the
building that collapsed on plaintiff and his vehicle.

Defendant

was in the rental business and owned all of the commercial
buildings located in the same complex, which covered approximately
a city block.

Said complex is located at Second North and Fourth

West in Salt Lake City directly behind West High School.

(See

plaintiff's Ex. 1 and 8).
The roof of the building that collapsed on plaintiff and
his vehicle was not the building where the cartons were stored
that Mr. Campbell intended to sell to plaintiff, nor was it the
building Mr. Campbell leased from the defendant.

The building

leased by Mr. Campbell pursuant to Plaintiff's Exhibit 11, is
depicted on plaintiff's Exhibit 1 as Building II.

See Record, p.

306, lines 16-25, p. 307, lines 1-5, defendant's answer to
-3-

plaintiff's interrogatory No 5, p. 027 of the Record, and p. 311,
lines 11-19.
The roof of the building that collapsed on plaintiff and
his vehicle was a reverse camber roof.

The outer eaves thereof

were higher than the center gable, thus it drained from the outer
eaves to the center line thereof.

Two open drains were located

along the lower part of the center line of said roof approximately
twenty feet from each end, and both ends of the roof were closed.
(See plaintiff's Exhibit 6)
The building that collapsed was not leased to any
particular tenant within said complex, and defendant retained
exclusive ownership and control over it as admitted by defendant
in its answer to plaintiff's complaint and plaintiff's
interrogatories.

See defendant's Answer, Record at 014, second

defense, second paragraph, as well as defendant's answer to
plaintiff's interro- gatories, Record at 026, second
interrogatory.

The area under the roof of said building at the

time of the incident was being used by Mr. Campbell and other
tenants of the defendant as a common parking area for their
vehicles.

See Record, p. 301, lines 23-25, p. 302, lines 1-24, p.

316, lines 12-25, and p. 317, lines 1-10.
At the time the roof of the building in question collapsed
there was a substantial accumulation of ice, snow and water
thereon.

See Record, p. 304, lines 13-17, p. 305, lines 5-22, p.

308, lines 17-25, p. 309, lines 104, p. 319, lines 14-25, p. 320,
-4-

lines l-25f p. 321f lines 1-25, p. 322, lines 1-25, p. 323, lines
1-22, and p. 335, lines 7-20.

Said accumulation having occurred

from about the 15th day of December, 1983, through the date the
roof of said building collapsed, to-wit January 25, 1984. The
temperatures were generally cold for four to five weeks just prior
to said roof collapsing, except for four or five warm intermittent
days during said period.

The temperatures warmed considerably a

day or two before the accident and on the day the roof collapsed
said temperatures rose to approximately 45° farenheit.

There was

also light rain and snow showers on the date the roof collapsed.
See Record, p. 336, lines 19-25, p. 337, pp. 338, 339, 340, 341,
and 342, lines 1-12, p. 344, lines 1-16.

Plaintiff's Ex 12.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
A.

The defendant, who was the owner and had the sole

control of the building that collapsed on plaintiff and his
vehicle located within the total complex owned by defendant, had a
duty and responsibility to the plaintiff as a business patron of
one of defendant's tenants doing business within defendant's
complex to keep the buildings which the defendant retained control
of within said complex safe for the plaintiff as a business patron
of one of defendant's tenants.
B.

Plaintiff's status on defendant's property as a

business patron of one of defendant's tenants is that of an
invitee not a licensee as the lower court held.

Irregardless of

plaintiff's status on the property as a business patron of one of
-5-

defendant's tenants as an invitee or licensee, the defendant is
required to exercise reasonable care in all circumstances toward
the plaintiff,
C.

Defendant failed to exercise reasonable care under the

circumstances of this case by not keeping the property within the
business complexf owned by it and retained under defendant's
control, in a reasonable safe condition for defendant's tenants
and its business patrons, to-wit:

the plaintiff.

Defendant

allowed a substantial amount of artificial accumulation of ice,
snow and moisture to build up over a period of approximately six
weeks on the roof of the building that collapsed on plaintiff and
plaintiff's vehicle and caused plaintiff to suffer damages,
thereby breaching the duty to plaintiff as a business patron of
defendant's tenant.
ARGDMENTS
The evidence presented to the lower court by plaintiff was
sufficient to establish a prima facie case against defendant of
negligence, vis-a-vis liability thereby barring a directed verdict
and raising factual issues to be presented to the jury.

A.

DEFENDANT OWED A DUTY TO PLAINTIFF AS THE OWNER

OF THE COMMERCIAL COMPLEX WITH SOLE CONTROL TO KEEP THE COMPLEX
REASONABLY SAFE FOR TENANTS AND THEIR BUSINESS PATRONS
There can be no doubt that the defendant owned the
commercial complex as well as the particular building that
-6-

collapsed on plaintiff and his vehicle, nor that defendant still
owned and controlled the particular building within said complex
that collapsed on the plaintiff and defendant had the sole
responsibility for the care and maintenance thereof.

Defendant

admits by its answer at p. 014 of the Record, in its second
defense at paragraph 2, that it owned the building in question.
Plaintiff's Exhibit 11 covers the property leased by the defendant
to Mr. Campbell in the same complex and the testimony of Mr.
Campbell in the Record at p. 306, lines 16-24f identifies said
lease and defendant as the owner of the property.

Defendant's

answers to plaintiff's interrogatories No. 2 and 5 at pp. 026 and
027 of the Record also admits that defendant still owned and
controlled the particular building that collapsed on the plaintiff
and that Mr. Campbell was a tenant of the defendant.

The

deposition of Patrick Bates, Record 414f pp. 3, 4f 5f 6f 7, and 8,
lines 1-22f as well as Ex. 1 attached thereto admits that
defendant owned all of the buildings located on the property
within the complex, as well as the real property.
The traditional common law rule of caveat-emptor relating
to landlord/tenant law has, over a period of time, been modified
so as to make a landlord liable under certain circumstances for
injuries resulting from dangerous conditions on the leased
premises.

Said modifications in the law come by way of the

following exceptions to the general rule of caveat-emptor.

-7-

1)

The lessor was under the obligation to disclose to the

lessee concealed dangerous conditions existing when possession was
transferred of which he had knowledge,
2) The lessor had a responsibility that continued for some
time after the transfer of possession for conditions involving an
unreasonable risk of harm to others outside the land.
3)

The lessor leased the land for a purpose which involved

the public.
4)

The lessor, either by written leasef orally or by his

actions undertook the duty to repair the leased premises after the
same was transferred.
5)

Different parts of the leased premises were leased to

several tenants but portions of the premises leased remained in
the possession and control of the landlord which the tenants were
permitted use off but did not occupy pursuant to the lease
agreement with the landlord.

The responsiiblity for the condition

of that part of the premises that the landlord retained control of
remained in the landlord.
Said defendant/landlord in this case, even at common law
under the foregoing exceptions, had an affirmative obligation to
exercise reasonable care to inspect and repair such parts of the
premises for the protection of the lessee and said duty extended
to the tenants1 invitees as well as others on the land in the
right of the tenant.

Prosser and Keeton on Torts, 5th Ed, §63,

Landlord and Tenant, pp. 434, 435, 436, 437, 440 and 441.
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See

also 49 AmJur2d Landlord and Tenant §806, 810, 811.
The obligation of the Lessor under all of the foregoing
exceptions is one of reasonable care and the lessor is not liable
where the condition was not discoverable by reasonable inspection
unless it is shown to have been of such duration as to remit the
conclusion that due care would have discovered the condition.

The

duty extends to conditions of purely natural origin such as ice
and snow.

Prosser and Keeton on Torts, supra.

See also 49

AmJur2d, supra.
Because of the discontent with the appearance of unfairness
in the landlord's general immunity from tort liability and with
the artificiality and increasing complexity of the various
exceptions to the seemingly archaic rule of non-liability on the
part of the landlord, the New Hampshire Supreme Court in Sargent v
Ross, N.H., 308 A2d 528 (1973) turned the rule on its head in 1973
and imposed upon the lessor a general tort duty of reasonable
care.

See Prosser and Keeton on Torts, 5th Ed., Lessor and Lessee

§63
The New Hampshire Court has been followed in several
jurisdictions including Utah.

In Williams v Melby, Utah, 699 P2d

723 (1985), the Utah court at p. 726 stated that
The common law duty of a landlord has been expanded in
virtually every state either judicially or by statute
beyond the narrow common law categories
this
court has charged landlords with the duty to exercise
reasonable care toward their tenants in all circumstances.
Landlord liability is no longer limited by the artificial
categories developed by the common law. (Emp. added)
-9-

See also Hall v Warren, Utah, 632 P2d 848 (1981) , and
Stephenson v Warner, Utahf 581 P2d 567 (1978).
The court at p.727(III) in Williams v Melby, supra, further
said that
Whether a defendant has breached the required standard of
care is generally a question for the jury, to be determined
by whether the injury which ocurred was of the type that
fell within the zone of risk created by the defendant's
negligent conduct. 'The care to be exercised in any
particular case depends upon the circumstances of that case
and on the extent of foreseeable danger involved and must
be determined as a question of fact.* DCR, Inc. v Peak
Alarm Co., Utah, 633 P2d 433 and Eaton v Savage, 28 Ut2d
353, 502 P2d 624 (1972), and
Wheeler v Jones, 19 Ut2d 392, 431 P2d 985 (1967). See 81
Mich.L.Rev. 99,112-13.
(Emp. added)
The court further stated in said case at p.728 that the
test is as follows:
If a reasonable prudent person should have know, or could
have learned by the exercise of reasonable care, that the
design or construction of the window constituted a
dangerous condition, the landlord could be held liable for
not taking adequate safety precautions
In
Becker v IRM Corp, 144 Cal.App.3d 321, 192 Cal.Rptr. 570
(1980) , that the court set aside a summary judgment because
the case presented a factual issue as to the whether the
landlord could have learned of the defective condition of
the property. Similarly here the court further stated a
trier of fact might find that the landlord should have
known that a defective condition existed and should have
taken precautions to avert the risk.
(Emp added)
It appears now that it is well settled in law in Utah that
the common law that limited the duty of the landlord except in
certain circumstances has been abandoned and Utah has adopted the
rule that the landlords do have a duty to exercise reasonable care
towards their tenants and said duty extends to the tenants
-10-

business patrons, if not to a lesser class, in all circumstances
and that landlords1 liability is no longer limited by the
artificial categories developed by the common law.

B.

PLAINTIFF'S STATUS WAS SUCH THAT DEFENDANT OWED

A DUTY OF CARE TO PLAINTIFF IN ALL CIRCUMSTANCES
There can be no doubt that Mr. Campbell, the individual
with whom the plaintiff transacted his business and who took
plaintiff to defendant's commercial complex, was a tenant of
defendant in said complex, nor can there be doubt that the
intended transaction between plaintiff and defendant's tenant, if
consummated, would have resulted in a commercial transaction which
would ultimately benefit defendant, to-wit: simply stated the
tenant can pay his rent to defendant if his carton business
succeeds.
The testimony of Mr. Campbell at p. 297, lines 14-25, p.
298, lines 1-5, p. 315, lines 20-25, and all of pp. 316 & 317,
line 1-6, indicates that Mr. Campbell entered into a commercial
transaction for the benefit of both plaintiff and defendant's
tenant, which ultimately benefited defendant, Mr. Campbell
intended to and did sell cartons to the plaintiff and others from
the property he leased from the defendant, and also that tenants
other than Campbell used Building I, Exhibit 1, that collapsed, as
a common parking area.

Said testimony further indicates that

Campbell invited plaintiff to follow him to the commercial complex
-11-

of defendant where their business was to be transacted and
plaintiff did so.

The testimony of plaintiff at p. 345, lines

5-25f and p. 346 and p. 347, lines

1-10, of the Record indicate

the transaction that plaintiff intended to enter into with
Campbell was to be a commercial one and that Campbelly a tenant of
defendantf directed and instructed plaintiff on how to get to his
landlord/defendant's property.
In Hiller v Harsh, 100 Ill.App.3d 332f 55 111.Dec. 635, 426
NE 2d 960, the court in an action brought against the manager and
owner of an apartment building to recover for personal injuries
claimed to have been sustained from a fall on the rear stairs of
the building, in applying the common law expanded it somewhat in a
different way than the Utah courts have done and stated that
. . . defendants owed plaintiff a duty of reasonable care
to keep common areas such as stairway in a reasonably safe
condition regardless of whether plaintiff was an invitee or
a licensee of the tenants; . . . .
(Emp. added)
Thus, the plaintiff in the Hiller case did not have to rise to the
level of an invitee in order for the landlord to owe the plaintiff
a duty of reasonable care.
The court stated further that the status of the injured
person on the landlords premises is important only to the extent
that that person is lawfully on the premises since duty of
reasonable care imposed upon landlord applies whether injured
person was a tenantf employee of the tenant, a business invitee of
a tenant, or a social guest in the same category as a licensee.
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In Hiller v Harsh, supra, the court in referring to the
common area retained in the landlord's control stated at p. 964
that
The term "lawfully on the premises" was first contrued in
Shiroma v Itano. In Shiroma the court looked to the legal
status of the injured person in relation to the tenant and
held that the term "lawfully" unquestionably extended the
landlord's duty of reasonable care to business invitees,
social invitees and licensees of the tenant. The duty to
refrain from wilful and wanton misconduct was found
applicable only to trespassers injured upon areas of the
leased premises that the landlord retained control over.
The rationale for such a construction has been stated as
follows:
"A lessor may be liable to an invitee or even to a
licensee of the lessee, although neither he nor the
lessee would be liable under the same circumstances
to their own invitees or licensees. The privilege
of the visitor is not based, as is that of the
lessor's own invitee or licensee, upon the consent
given upon the occasion of the particular visit,
but upon the fact that he is entitled to enter by
the right of the lessee, who is entitled under his
lease to use the part of the land within the
control of the lessor not only for himself, but
also for the purpose of receiving any persons whom
he chooses to admit." Restatement (Second) of
Torts §360, Comment c (1965).
At page 965 the court further stated that:
As it is undeniable that the plaintiff was lawfully on the
common area of the defendants' premises, her legal status
as an invitee or social guest or licensee of the Hannahs is
unimportant since the same duty of reasonable care is
imposed upon the defendants to keep the care the common
areas reasonably safe.
In the instant case plaintiff is not compelled to rely upon
the rationale of the Hiller case or the common law, supra, because
his status on the premises rises to a higher level than that of
the plaintiff in the Illinois case.
-13-

Prosser & Keeton on Torts, 5th Ed, at p. 412, §60, defines
a licensee in its broadest sense as follows:
In its broadest sense, the term "licensee" includes anyone
who has a license, which is to say a privilege, to enter
upon land. It has sometimes been employed to designate any
person who comes upon the land with a privilege arising
from the consent of the possessor, including all invitees.
But as the word is most commonly used by the courts, it is
limited to those who enter with that consent and nothing
more.
Such a person
comes for his own purposes rather
than for any purpose or interest of the possessor of the
land
At page 413 of the Hornbook series it states that persons
included in the class of a licensee are:
. . loafers, loiterers, and people who come in only to get
out of the weather; those in search of their children,
servants or other third persons; spectators and sightseers
not in any way invited to come; those who enter for social
visits or personal business dealings with employees of the
possessor of the land; . . . .
Under the common law without any exceptions the plaintiff
might have been nothing more than a licensee, but with the
exceptions developed by the conunon law relating to areas retained
in the landlord's control and even the Illinois court, supra,
which only required the person injured to be lawfully upon the
land and did not make a distinction between invitee and licensee
as to such common areas and subsequently with the Supreme Court of
the State of Utah totally abolishing all of the categories set by
the common law, it is obvious that when the law as outlined above
is applied to the facts of this case, the defendant owes the
plaintiff a duty to act reasonable under the circumstances. That
-14-

duty includes the duty of inspection and making the premises safe
for the plaintiff, a proposition that the lower court rejected.
The status of the plaintiff in the instant case, even
though he may not now be required to be under the existing law in
the State of Utahf was that of an inviteef which are those:
Who enter premises upon business which concerns the
occupier, and upon his invitationf express or implied.
The latter is under an affirmative duty to protect themf
not only against dangers of which he knowsf but also
against those which with reasonable care he might discover.
He is sometimes called the business visitor
and is placed upon a higher footing than a licensee. . . .
. . The typical example . . . is a customer in a store . .
. . and other businesses open to the public are included,
as are drivers calling for or delivering goods purchased or
sold . . . as well as a large and miscellaneous group of
similar persons who are present in the interest of the
occupier as well as their own. (Emp. added)
The important points in the determination of an invitee is

1)

invitation, 2) pecuniary profit, or at least the potential
thereof.

Prosser and Keeton on Torts, supra, p. 419, §61,

Invitees.
At p. 421:
Others who have been considered to be an invitee are those
who bring employees their lunch with the encouragement of
the management and even possible purchasers who look at
displays in shop windows, or who desire on the particular
occasion only to use a toilet, or a telephone open to the
public, or even the man who goes into a bank to change a
five dollar bill, or into a building to ead a notice
required by law to be posted there, all have been held to
be invitees.
At p. 422:
. . .a large number of courts which hold that many
visitors, from whose presence no shadow of pencuniary
benefit can be found are invitees.
-15-

It seems that emphasis has been placed upon the invitation,
but at p. 424, Prosser states that:
It is in connection with invitations to enter private land,
not held open to the public, that possible pecuniary
benefit has its greatest importance - but only as
justifying an expectation that the place has been prepared
and made safe for the visit. Anyone invited to transact
business or do work on private premises not open to the
public normally has the assurance that the place is
prepared for him . . •
(Emp. added)
At p. 425 of Prosser it outlines the care required as follows:
The occupier is not an insurer of the safety of invitees,
and his duty is only to exercise reasonable care for their
protection, but the obligation of reasonable care is a full
one, applicable in all respects, and extending to
everything that threatens the invitee with an unreasonable
risk of harm. The occupier must not only use care not to
injure the visitor by negligent activities, and warn him of
hidden dangers known to the occupier, but he must also act
reasonably to inspect the premises to discover possible
dangerous conditions of which he does not know, and take
reasonable precautions to protect the invitee from dangers
which are foreseeable from the arrangement or use of the
property. (Emp. added)
At p. 426:
. . . . The mere existence of a defect or danger is
generally insufficient to establish liability, unless it is
shown to be of such a character or of such duration that
the jury may reasonably conclude that due care would have
discovered it. (Emp. added)
The traditional distinctions in the duties of care owed to
persons entering land based upon their status as a trespasser,
licensee or invitee have been criticized for some time as being
harsh, mechanical, unduly complex, and overly protective of
property interests at the expense of human safety.

In 1957,

England by statute abolished the distinction between licensees and
-16-

invitees and imposed upon the occupier a common duty of care
toward all persons who lawfully enter the premises.

This was

followed in the United States in 1958 by a Supreme Court decision
refusing to engraft the traditional distinctions into the law of
admiralty.

See Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique,

1959, 358 U.S. 625, 79 SupCt 406.
Ten years thereafter in 1968 the Supreme Court of
California in Rowland v Christian, 70 Cal.Rp. 97, 443 P2d 561,
abolished the traditional duty classifications scheme for
trespassers, licensees and invitees and replaced it with the
ordinary negligent principals of foreseeable risk and reasonable
care.

Over the next ten or twelve years, eight other

jurisdictions followed suit abolishing all class distinctions
between entrance on land and another five jurisidictions discarded
the distinction between licensees and invitees, but retained the
traditional duty limitations toward trespassing adults. Prosser,
supra, pp. 432, 433.
In Jay Stevens v Salt Lake County, 25 Ut2d 168, 478 P2d
496, the court stated at p. 171 the following:
In considering the duty of a landlord to persons coming on
his property it is appropriate to point out the distinction
between what are termed invitees or business visitors as
compared to those who are termed licensees. In order to
qualify as the former, one who goes on the premises of
another must do so at the invitation of the owner. This
may be expressed or it may be implied because it is done in
connection with the owner's business or some mutual
business of advantage to the owner. With respect to such
invitees the landowner has a comparatively high degree of
care to assure their safety. A licensee is one who goes on
the land of another without any such invitation. . . . . .
-17-

In the instance of licensees it is considered that the
owner has somewhat lesser degree of duty than he has to
invitees or business visitors.
(Emp added)
In the instant case it seems obvious that plaintiff was
invited to the property by defendant's tenant who had, if not
express authority, implied authority to tender the invitation. In
a later Utah case Tjas v. Proctor, 591 P2d 438 (1979), the court
at p. 441 still held to the doctrine based on the concept that a
person's status on the property when injured is controlling as it
pertains to the question of liability.

Said court stated in that

case that the duty owed by a property owner to one who is injured
on his property depends on whether that person is an invitee or a
licensee or a trespasser.

Since the Tjas case, supra, little has

been said by the Supreme Court of Utah about the status
classification of the injured party.
In Williams v Melby, supra, it appears that the court may
have removed the status classification of the injured individual
entirely when it said:
This court has charged landlords with a duty to exercise
reasonable care towards their tenants in all circumstances.
(Emp. added)

C.

DEFENDANT BREACHED ITS DUTY OF CARE TO THE PLAINTIFF

Plaintiff based his right to recovery on the fact that the
defendant let snow and ice accumulate on the roof of the building
over a period of approximately six weeks and never removed or
attempted to remove the same. That said accumulation of snow and
-18-

ice during said period melted and froze thereby causing an
artificial accumulation of icef snow and moisture on the roof
freezing the center drains solid making it impossible for any
moisture to drain from the roof except by filling the reverse
camber area to such an extent that the moisture would run over the
outer edges of said roof after sufficient snow, ice and water
accumulated on it.

Said snow, ice and water did accumulate on the

roof of the building to such an extent that the water was, in
fact, running over

the outer eaves thereof on the date that the

same collapsed indicating that said accumulation of moisture was
trapped on the roof of the building and the weight thereof caused
it to collapse.

Mr. {Cellar's testimony in the Record, at p. 319,

lines 14-25, p. 320, and especially lines 3-7 on p. 321, describes
the status of the accumulation of the moisture on the roof quite
accurately in answers to questions put to him as follows:
Q.

Did you have an opportunity to observe the snow on the
building on the roof before it collapsed?

A.

You could see portions of it from my position from my
warehouse door. You could see that the roof was full(Emp. added)

At lines 11-15, p. 321, the following was solicited from the
witness:
Q.

What did you observe if anything on that day with
regard to the snow on the building?

A.

Well it had been dripping on the — it would be the
northwest corner where I usually do park.

Q.

It was dripping off this corner?

A.

Uh huh.

(Affirmative)
-19-

See also McKeller's testimony at pp« 322, 323, and 324,
lines 1-23, and especially p. 335, lines 7-20, where the witness
stated the following:

Q.

You indicated to counsel that you didn't see any
reason to be concerned about the building when you
observed it the day before, and on the day that it
fell until you heard the noises. You had NO concern
about the ice and snow that you talked about that was
stacked up on top of the building?

A.
Q.

Wellr yeah, there was concern. Everybody had been
saying, in the newspaper and everything — shovelling
snow. But they are warehouses.
Did you have any concern about the ice on top?

A.

Not really.

Q.

You didn't think it was going to fall in?

A.

Well, I didn't park my car there.
(Emp added)

See also the testimony of Keith Brown, an expert weather
consultant beginning at p. 336, line 25, and all of pp. 337, 338,
339, 340, 341, and 342, lines 1-12, as well as plaintiff's Ex. 12
in conjunction with Mr. Brown's testimony, all of which indicate
the condition of the weather during the period of time from about
the 15th of December through the 25th of January, the date of the
accident.
Said defendant knew, or with the exercise of reasonable
care should have known, that such an accumulation of ice, snow and
water on a reverse camber roof without proper drainage or with the
center drains frozen and plugged or without defendant physically
-20-

removing said accumulation of moisture from the rooff that the
same would create a substantial risk and be a hazard to tenants
and their customers and, in factf did become such when the roof
collapsed as it did.
The lower court seemingly resurrected the status of
caveat-emptor in this case when it imposed the status of a
licensee on the plaintiff, who had no opportunity to discover the
risk and danger involved, whenf in factf the landlord had ample
time to discover the danger and correct the same.
has such an advantage over the
responsibility.

When one party

other, which party should bear the

The answer seems obvious in the instant case,

that the defendant should do so.

CONCLUSION
The evidence presented to the lower court was sufficient to
establish liability on the part of the defendant to submit the
case to the jury, and the lower court erred when it failed to do
so and granted the defendant's motion for a directed verdict.
Respectfully submitted this 5th day of June, 1987.
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DENNIS C. FERGUSON - Bar No. A1061
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone:

521-9000

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DONALD H. GREGORY,

)
Plaintiff,

)

)
)
FOURTH WEST INVESTMENTS, LTD., )
dba of ELLIS R. IVORY, a
)
general partnership,
)

DIRECTED VERDICT

vs.

Defendant.

Civil No. C84-2377
Judge Timothy R. Hanson

)

This action came on regularly for trial commencing
November 18, 1986 at 10:00 A.M., before the Honorable Timothy
R. Hanson, District Court Judge, sitting with jury, in Salt
Lake City, Utah.

Plaintiff was represented by Byron L. Stubbs,

defendant was represented by Dennis C. Ferguson of the law firm
of Snow, Christensen & Martineau.

A jury of eight people was

regularly empaneled and sworn to try the action.

Plaintiff

proceeded with the presentation of his evidence on November 18,
19 and 20.
At the close of the evidence offered by plaintiff,
defendant moved for a directed verdict pursuant to Rule 50(a),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, on the grounds that plaintiff

had failed to establish a prima facia case of liability.
Having heard and considered the argument of counsel
and viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiff,
resolving all facts and inferences in favor of the plaintiff,
the Court finds that plaintiff has failed to present any
substantial evidence establishing defendant's liability and
there is no reasonable basis in the evidence and the inferences
to be drawn therefrom that would support judgment against
defendant and in favor of the plaintiff except upon mere
speculation or conjecture.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED, DIRECTED AND ADJUDGED that judgment
be, and the same is, hereby rendered in favor of the defendant
and against the plaintiff, no cause of action.
DATED this

/^

day of

Af&

frf/risd^^9

BY THE COURT:

o
Timothy R. Hanson
District Court Judge
Approved as to Form:

Byron L. Stubbs
Attorney for Plaintiff
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THE COURT:

Well, gentlemen, a motion for a

22 i directed verdict, the Court must, and appropriately so,

I
23 i weigh every inference in favor of the Plaintiff against
i

!

24 j whom the motion is served.

And the Court must find after

25 ! putting that test to it that there is such a lack of

1 I evidence that the matter as a matter of law cannot be
2 ! submitted to a jury for whatever reason, failure of proof,
3 I speculation, conjecture, whatever.
4 i

It seems to me that the motion hinges on two
different areas.

One is causation,that is why the roof

fell, and two, the question of whether or not there was
negligence on causation.
The evidence that we have is that there was a
9 [ build-up of snow on the roof, and it weighed a certain
10

| amount per square foot.

Unless you really know what that

i

n , means in terms of stresses and force, a lay person could
i
12

j only conject as to what that means structurally.

Maybe

13

i

I
13

| pounds per square inch, or whatever it was, is perfectly

14 '( safe for this roof application, or perhaps it's too much.

I
15 j If that was the sole basis for the motion for a directed

16 verdict, I don't have any difficulty with it, because I
17 i would deny the motion, not because I think there is a
18 | plethora of evidence, but maybe there would be an inference
19 I that the jury could rely upon, and appropriately rely upon
i

2 0 i as to causation.
21 j

But there is nothing else yet suggested.

I agree with Mr. Stubbs that he does not have to

i

22 I rule out all possibilities for causation.

23

suggest some.

24 to that level.

He has to

I f m not at all sure that the evidence rises
But I have enough concern about it that I

25 ' would not grant the motion on a directed verdict on that

19

1

basis alone.

2

The second problem gives me much greater concern.

3

The only evidence before this Court as to the duty of this

4

building owner is that there was snow on the roof.

5

even if I'm to assume that the jury would be entitled to

6

infer from the fact that there was snow on the roof, that

7

that caused the building to collapse, I can f t find any

8

negligence.

9

have known about it.

And

There is nothing to indicate that they should
There is nothing in the records to

10 I indicate that that much snow on the roof would lead a
11

reasonable building owner with a flat roof of this kind to

12

do something about it.

13

advised about snow buildup on the roof, or that it reached

14

dangerous proportions.

15

There is no evidence that they were

There is no evidence that they didn't make

16

frequent—not frequent, but appropriate inspections,

17

because I don't have any evidence as to what an appropriate

18

inspection would be.

19

The evidence in this case shows that at best, the

20

Plaintiff was a licensee.

I do not think that there is a

21

duty to formally inspect for licensees.

22

business invitee as to these Defendants so that they have

23

an affirmative obligation to make an inspection to make the

It is not a

24 | premises safe.
25 ]

I think the case doesn't make out a prima facia

20

1

case on negligence, gentlemen, not even taking into account

2

the proximate causation issue.

3

together, I'm compelled to direct a verdict in this case.

4

And I'm going to direct a verdict in favor of the Defendant

5

and against the Plaintiff on that issue, reluctantly,

6

And when I add those two

I've never granted one before in the four years

7 J I've been on the bench, because I don't like them.
8 I think you've got to make out a case.

But I

Otherwise I'm

9 I compelled, and I will follow the law as I perceive it to
10

be.

11

Supreme Court will tell me about it.

12

case yet that says that the mere fact that the accident

13

occurred means that somebody was negligent.

14

rule changes, fine.

15

change at the Supreme Court.

15 j

If the law is more broad than I perceive it to be, the
But I haven't read a

And if the

But it won't change here.

It will

Mr. Ferguson, I will ask you to prepare an

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

(

21

